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Dr Jonathan Vickery 
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Note: this paper is written to be spoken, and as will become evident was 
accompanied by images, which cannot be reproduced here for reasons of copyright. 
 
Preamble:  
            This paper emerged from a brief exchange in the context of the Warwick 
Global Research Priority in International Development (internal research network). 
The exchange left me with a general question: Can aesthetics play any meaningful 
role in International Development – research or strategy? Conceptually, the relation 
between research and strategy is a topic of interest in my own field of cultural policy 
studies, particularly pertaining to recent global trends in using arts, culture and 
creative industries as instruments of social and economic development; and of 
interest, of course, in relation to the work of global institutions like UNESCO and their 
various declarations and UN Conventions, like the 2005 Convention on the 
Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. The world over, 
the arts and culture now function in three ways: (i) as stimulants of education, 
community and general civility (or citizenship); (ii) as forms of innovation and 
creativity for solving instrumental problems (particularly in developing urban 
economies, where skills and knowledge of new technologies are required); and (iii), 
of course, in start-up creative and media industries – particularly businesses that 
engage in, or support, international trade. 
 My contention in this paper is that the arts and culture are rarely cast in their 
own terms – in terms of their own productive potential, as distinctive or independent 
forms of cultural value or value-creation (involving experience, thought, 
interpretation, public reasoning and critical dissent from social norms, and a 
developing civil society around the kinds of cultural production that facilitate all these 
elements). And so theories of development (particularly in relation to poverty) too 
often position the arts and culture as marginal priorities – desirable but not essential 
in relation to the alleviation of poverty and deprivation. My interest here, is, of course, 
in conceptualising the arts and culture as internal to development policies on poverty 
and deprivation. 
  This is not to say that a researcher will not be able to locate truly impressive 
arts and culture for development all over the world. Here in Coventry two weeks ago 
we enjoyed the Rising Global Peace Forum, a showcase for so much powerful 
artistic engagement in development discourse. I currently have a research assistant 
who's regular occupation is for a cultural organisation in Phnom Penh called 
Cambodian Living Arts. The British Council, and many NGOs – like Manchester 
University's In Place of War project – undertake extraordinary projects. My argument 
in this paper is more general (on the practice) and more specific (on the theory) – 
that there exists no theoretical basis for a policy infrastructure where the 'aesthetics' 
of arts and culture are articulated. And we must make an immediate distinction 
between aesthetics and the global trend in 'creativity' (creative economy, creative 
cities, creative industries, and so on), which is, as we know, very popular with 
governments otherwise hostile to other expressions of civil society.  
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             Assuming the absence of a theoretical basis for such a policy framework, I 
will not be looking at specific development policies, so my aims are more in the line 
of a scoping exercise or coordinating a small range of empirical and theoretical 
issues so as to define how aesthetics – as an historical concept – can generate 
specifically useful and credible terms for development. I use the term 'deprivation' in 
my title, as this is how poverty is articulated by Amartya Sen in his now famous 
Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation (1982). Given the 
rise of the Human Development (HD) discourse as the principle articulation of the 
development subject's own role and position in relation to poverty-based 
development policy, I will situate my line of investigation within HD. What I find 
particularly attractive about the Human Development 'capabilities approach' is both 
the 'humanisation' of development, where development is defined in terms of 
individual human agency and not broad collective needs. I don't know how familiar 
you are with this – largely inspired by Sen's work, it has become a major dimension 
of UN development policy, with its famous annual report and Index – my interest will 
extend only to its central problematic: human capability. I'll come to this more 
specifically in the third and last part of this talk – the first two parts are about 
aesthetics: first, the concept of the aesthetic; and second, aesthetics as historical 
discourse. 
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Part 1: the troubling concept of ‘aesthetics’ We have to begin with the question 
on whether aesthetics is a delimited realm of human experience at all, and so an 
object of inquiry? One can use the phrase 'an aesthetics' of just about anything, 
insofar as aesthetics semantically refers to (etymologically, from the Gk aesthesis) 
sense-perception or the operation of the senses in the acquisition of meaning or 
cognition. In its Greek iteration (Plato's Republic, and his notorious Book X) it 
strongly connoted the expression and communication of emotion. And in our own 
time, aesthetics is used in physiology, behavioural psychology or the psychology of 
perception, and neuropsychology particularly, but in a more unqualified sense is 
applied as a prefix to many forms of cultural inquiry. We find aesthetics-like forms of 
inquiry in anthropology, philosophical phenomenology, the study of cultural memory 
(and its fascinating variants, like 'cultural trauma'), and the study of affective form, 
symbolic meaning or visual sense-making in contemporary Art History. Here, 
however, I want to consider the historical concept of aesthetics, which posits a 
distinctive (autonomous) realm of human experience and knowledge. In other words, 
it is not a synonym for the experience of the visual in general, or of affective visual 
communication. As an historical concept, aesthetics maintained two foci – (i) form (as 
in the form of nature, or form of a work of art) and (ii) experience (as in perception 
and cognition -- of form, but extending to the analysis or criticism of judgements of 
taste or discriminations in relation to form). Renowned philosophical works, like 
Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Judgment (Kritik der Urteilskraft: the 'Third Critique' of 
1790) maintain a particular and complex understanding of the constitution of 
perception in relation to the cognition of form, and the implications of this for 
judgement, taste and critical thought – so much so, over 200 years later his text is 
still the subject of exegesis, not simply reference or interpretation. In the history of 
art, it is difficult to find a more significant term than 'form', in part as form has been 
defined through the enduring phenomenon of beauty. However, the phenomenon of 
beauty became a central problematic within cultural modernity by 1860 or even 
before (remember Courbet, then Manet), and more recently, has been excoriated (in 
part as a euphemism of the entire tradition of aesthetic inquiry) during the 1980s and 
1990s by poststructuralists and postmodernists. The way beauty has come to be 
routinely derided as, at best crass ('kitsch') and at worse, masking domination 
through seduction (or appeals to a quasi-metaphysical order of 'human-nature'), still 
endures within development discourse. Indeed, can beauty be admitted to 
representations of poverty and deprivation, and if not why not? I would say that we 
would assume it to be offensive; for representations of poverty and deprivation must 
on principle, if not precaution, preclude cultural expressions involving beauty and the 
pleasures of form. But what if such cultural expression emerges from the subjects of 
development themselves? What would we say in the face of photographic 
expressions of beauty from a starving person in Malawi or Eritrea? On what grounds 
would we deny them such an exercise of agency, or assume them to be acting on 
false assumptions – unwitting agents of colonial domination? 
 
             What cultural rights do they indeed possess? This is something I wish to 
pursue, tangentially, but before I do we might well consider the 'controversy' of 
photographer Jimmy Nelson – who was (as far as one can tell) sincere in attempting 
to respect the autonomy of his subjects while expressing their visual beauty. His 
book (and subsequent website) Before they Pass Away (2009) comprise portraits of 
tribes and tribal cultures around the world (the Kalam of Indonesia and Papua New 
Guinea; the Kazakh tribe in Mongolia, and so on) all threatened by extinction 
because of poverty, deprivation or some other serious threat. As his images began to 
circulate, he was accused, among other things, of 'misrepresenting' his subjects and 
their desperate plight. But, in my view, where many of the criticisms were politically 
inappropriate (or at least non-cognisant of Nelson’s artistic approach), they indicated 
a genuine problematic central to the visual construction of beauty in a contemporary 
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development context. Nelson’s photographs are stunningly beautiful, so much so, the 
beauty is arresting and entirely satisfying of any other form of intellectual curiosity we 
may have (curiosity for who the subject is, what their particular plight is, and so on). I 
cannot offer a 'reading' of these images, but I will suggest that here beauty functions 
to activate the photograph as a field of exploration for our own visual desire, and in 
so doing does not provide the means or conditions for allowing the subjects' own 
articulation of social agency to find expression. The photographs, in making these 
indigenous or tribal peoples utterly sensually and stylistically beautiful, insert them 
into our world, not us into theirs. They demand no cognitive interest or involvement 
on the part of the viewer as to our relation to them. 
 And many of us remember, as undergraduates, our venerable professors 
declaring how the aesthetic was fundamentally ideological – in its power to substitute 
thought for feeling, masking the real nature of social agency, or the agency of nature, 
and thereby as an independent intellectual inquiry aesthetics had become critically 
bankrupt (unless, that is, aesthetics meant the philosophy of art or criticism i.e. as 
philosophy proper, which takes the phenomenon or discourse of 'aesthetic' as its 
object).  
 Broadly, the reasons were (and they were always broad) that (a) in the age of 
post-structuralism, no realm of experience was un-structured by language; aesthetics 
suggested a pre- or supra-linguistic sphere of experience, which offered a superior 
level of cognitive reflexivity (notions take up, as it happened, by phenomenology and 
then deconstruction on very different terms); and (b) the Post-modern cultural epoch 
was irrefutably dissolving the historical-institutional European value systems of taste 
and hierarchies of fine art through which philosophical aesthetics had forged its self-
definition. 
 Here, I want to make another brief observation about development 
photography, and the way these two principles above became axiomatic to the 
pervasive influence of semiotics (not to one of the many specific disciplines of 
semiotic or semiosis analysis as such, but to the general philosophy of artistic 
practice that absorbed semiotics as axiomatic truths). Development photographers I 
have spoken to over the last ten years or so have, without a doubt, absorbed a 
general semiotic understanding of the visual, and this has happened symbiotically 
with the rise of normative discourses of human rights and gender equality, social 
justice and recognition. In the absence of a longitudinal study of development 
photography aesthetics, simply by extracting a random series of examples from sites 
like Guardian Global Development or the UNDP website, we can identify common 
characteristics, if not visual strategies and their animating consensus of pictorial 
values. The strategies carefully compose and crop the photograph to generate a 
visually striking unified image, with a single focal point, usually a human subject, who 
is not, however, separated visually from their community or environment. They are 
positioned, framed or asked to perform in such a way that they represent that 
community or environment – through physical proximity, gesture, situation or 
orientation; and furthermore, that human subject, even though their context of 
'development' is one of poverty and deprivation, they are active agents of change – 
visually attractive, agile, and oriented in a way that suggests productive action. Of 
course, we can still find images of victims, death and destruction, but these tend only 
to be in contexts of disaster, aid and relief (like famine or war) rather than 
development per se. This situation contrasts, of course, to now famous BBC 
reportage and images of the 1970s, embedded in the minds of older generations like 
many of us, for example Michael Beurk's foreign correspondence on BBC News on 
the 1984 Ethiopian famine. 
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 One example I like to discuss with my students is Annie Leibovitz's photo-
shoot for Louise Vuitton 'Core Values' campaign in 2011 – Angelina Jolie had been 
an UNHCR Goodwill Ambassador since 2001 and active in Cambodia. I use this 
beautiful image to demonstrate the semiotic inseparability of aesthetic qualities from 
the symbolic language of Western humanitarianism as codified in particular 
orientations to gender (signs, codes and myths).  
 The pervasive assumption is, then, that 'aesthetics' is not a distinct category 
of analysis, because it is always inscribed within some or other discourse and power 
regime of representation – which becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. We live in and 
through global mediascapes, as Arjun Appadurai (1990) would say; and the 
mediascape is replete with semiotically-constructed (not merely ‘interpreted’) 
imagery, which precludes of any sense of an independent aesthetic realm as a 
condition of empowering the agency of the subject so pictured (though of course, in 
this case the 'empowering' is symbolic only, as photography in itself does not involve 
a change in the material conditions of the subject or actual change, even though it 
hopes to playing a role in affecting such). But at what cost, we may ask? Do we miss 
anything by losing the aesthetic? Without gesturing to a theory of specifically 
photographic aesthetics, I would suggest that by virtue of losing the indefinable 
aesthetic to the semiotically comprehendible, we lose a powerful dimension of the 
affective and emotional power an image can possess (I would argue that semiotically 
programmed images are designed to be 'read' and not 'experienced'; are routinely 
didactic or politically instructive, and at times self-censored, and they appeal to 
cognition and not to perception; they are not perceptually complex, but are all too 
often structured 'classically' in a way Leon Battista Alberti or any Renaissance artist 
would recognise). This affective and emotional power is not an issue of velocity, but 
media. What I wish to question is the role of the photographer: semiotically-coded 
images are not self-reflexive as images. They may problematise their subject 
conceptually, but not problematise themselves as media (as an operation of human 
subjectivity and technology producing a certain species of image about the world). In 
fact, I find the critique of Jimmy Nelson relevant also to the modish photographic 
practices of politically-Left development photographers: they tell us more about the 
Western political imaginary than they do the subjects of development. 
  So, to conclude my Part 1: It's hard to see how 'aesthetics' has any 
meaningful or critical use in understanding the form of contemporary development 
imagery, other than to problematise – as with Jimmy Nelson – the whole enterprise 
of representation as such. But it also seems to me that we lose something, to do with 
the moral intensity of visual experience and the self as producer of imagery of the 
world.  
 
2: Critique and aesthetic experience 
To further compound the fate of aesthetics, I could reiterate the claims of critical 
theory since the second generation Frankfurt School (c1940-60): How, in the 
Twentieth Century, culture itself has become the object of industrialisation, material 
for mass media communications, and so how both its aesthetics and stylistics have 
become absorbed in an emerging consumer economy (i.e. as designed commodities 
and brands – famously theorised by Lash and Urry in their book Economies of Signs 
and Space of 1992). The marketplace has become a symbolic landscape of affective 
and emotionally powerful form and experience, invested in consumption and new 
orders of value based on human desire. Through this process, as we all well know, 
Modern art became resolutely anti-aesthetic (or critical of the idea and values of 




 Terry Eagleton's The Ideology of the Aesthetic (1990) made a huge impact on 
its publication when I was an undergraduate, and is useful in expanding on the 
‘economic absorption’ of art, but also for defining the enduring significance of 
‘aesthetics’. After Marxist thinkers like Lukács, Adorno, and an eclectic range of other 
non-Marxist thinkers (Left-leaning poststructuralists), Eagleton argued that aesthetics 
as a philosophical tradition of thought was, in fact, more properly understood as an 
'ideology' (i.e. it is formative of the collective subjectivity of the bourgeois classes in 
19C Europe, and so their project of the nation state and citizenship). And with the 
mass movements of the 20th Century, aesthetics really came into its own, from the 
ascendency of the British Empire to Nazi Germany: in the 1930s and 40s, aesthetics 
became politics, as Walter Benjamin later put it.  
 But, there is another dimension to Eagleton's argument, which he takes from 
the Frankfurt tradition and which is significant here. I will mention it in relation to his 
book cover, the famous painting by German romantic, Caspar David Friedrich, 
Wanderer über dem Nebelmeer of 1818. On referring to Wikipedia to check the date 
of this painting, I remarked upon two quotations attributed to  Friedrich: "I have to 
stay alone in order to fully contemplate and feel nature"; and "The painter should 
paint not only what he has in front of him, but also what he sees inside himself." Yes, 
there is always a politics of gender in aesthetics, but what's being articulated here? It 
is a sense of agency: what is articulated in these simple and unashamedly romantic 
statements is how the aesthetic evoked deep and profound thoughts, human 
plenitude, awesome pleasures and deep sensuality, and most of all, the human 
subject finding a solitary confidence in the face of the expansive enormity and 
perilous potential of nature. Kant would define this experience as sublimity, with a 
specific theoretical explication of it, but here I am more interested in the apparent 
individuation of human agency through a profound subjectivisation of experience – 
by 'othering' or a simultaneous envelopment and resistance (resistance through 
envelopment?) to threatening surrounds. Here, the critical element of this is its 
capacity for self-evaluation – what used to be called 'reflection'. Aesthetics was  a 
reflective apprehension of one's own capacity for experience; a conscious reflexivity 
with regard to increasing one's perceptual powers (Bowie, 2003). 
  This romantic strain in the broad evolution of aesthetics (as a philosophical 
inquiry whose object of theory is the experiential relation between human nature and 
material nature) fascinates me, as it pertains to human agency and its expansion. 
But while Eagleton would reduce this aesthetic expansion of individual experience 
and sense of self (by its encounter with the Other of nature), to a collective ego 
defining itself through its ascendency in the ladder of class power, for thinkers like 
Adorno, this expansion of the individual's powers of perception held out another 
potential. This potential (articulated most acutely in avant-garde music after the 
Second Viennese School) amounted to a human capability in resistance to limits 
imposed on experience by the rising symbiosis of capital and authoritarian 
government. Capitalist modernity is often cast as a crisis of collective solidarity, class 
politics, and social justice, in the face of increasing consumerism and thus 
individualism. But for Adorno, capitalist modernity's first victim was actual, reflexive, 
aesthetically educated, individuality – of a form of human thought and experience of 
human thought that had to facility to be non-identical to the mass, the system, the 
state and its repressive homogenisation masking as free choice (Adorno, 1979). 
Individuality must be re-cast, if it is not to become absorbed in the mass politics of 
the Left as much as mass consumerism of the Right.  
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 However, there are two notable reasons why aesthetics as an intellectual 
tradition was curtailed or truncated in terms of its exploration of aesthetic agency as 
social theory. The first was the seemingly internal relation between the capacity for 
such experience and specific or generalised prosperity (the Wanderer doesn't look 
like a poor man – Eagleton would say that there is a necessary interconnection 
between the capacity of aesthetic experience and the security, confidence and latent 
send of nature's meaningfulness, with a prosperity whose complexion can only be 
accounted for with reference to Nineteenth century capitalism). Starting with 
Baumgarten, then Kant, both influenced by a generation of educated and privileged 
British (Hume, Burke, Shaftesbury, Addison and so on) the very concept of aesthetic 
experience emerged symbiotically with a growing human domination over nature, 
and a growing domination over others who did not share in this growing assumption 
of power. Aesthetic experience is just the experience of that form of power. 
 The second issue is the problem of the industrialisation and 
institutionalisation of culture, I previously mentioned, particularly the aesthetic in 
modern art after 1930 and the emergence of aesthetics in popular culture. By 
Habermas, the aesthetic dissolves as a significant concept in Frankfurt critical social 
theory. And with this, I will conclude this section with another moment of nostalgia – 
what I think was my first encounter (or remembered encounter) with a visual image of 
actual poverty: the album cover for the 1971 Concert for Bangladesh (though I 
encountered it somewhat later than 1971, of course). The experience of this image 
has remained with me throughout my life, and there is much that could be said about 
it. I don't want to offer a reading of the image here, but relevant to our subject, is how 
this typical post-1960s style of photography – mawkish and beautiful in the most 
aesthetically regressive manner – was nonetheless used as symbolic warfare in a 
very powerful activist project. The album was part of the first major protest at poverty 
by Western pop musicians (George Harrison and Ravi Shankar), in this instance at 
the state of refugees from what was East Pakistan, following the Bangladesh 
Liberation War genocide in 1971.  
 The photograph of the child was not itself a solitary image, an aesthetic 
contemplation of which will yield a sense of its value and power to inspire: it was one 
image in a complex symbolic discourse of resistance to colonialism and authority 
through musical activism. It might be considered in terms of its aesthetic singularity, 
but this arguably will not identify its source of power – even aesthetic power. The 
possibility that a single visual image might become inseparable from a broader field 
of aesthetic experiences (plural) – a political aesthetics of a social movement – was 
not considered by Frankfurt School (and thus Marxist) theory, and so aesthetics 
seemed increasingly anachronistic. But this line of thought exceeds my argument; I 

















Part 3: Development politics and policy 
 In development economics and policy, poverty as a concept is no less 
historical and problematic than aesthetics. It has its own discursive history, 
conditioned by dominant lines of inquiry, and the lines of inquiry that we may be more 
interested in today do not see economic or material poverty and social poverty as 
two distinct categories. From Amartya Sen, Mahbub ul Haq and the UNDP's Human 
Development group, to development economists like Hans Singer (Dependency 
Theory pioneer) to property rights theorist Hernando de Soto Polar, and countless 
others, we have inherited two axiomatic premises on which they all seem to agree: 
(a) poverty is never random or abstract, but is a consequence of a configuration of 
systematic and societal material conditions – it is not, for example, an aggregate of 
individual rational choices; and (b) poverty is not inevitable or a natural cycle of 
material shortages common to an economy; it is a structural phenomenon, (i.e. not 
created by poor people). However, the framework of conceptualision through which 
poverty is explained tends to the macro-economic: defining ‘the individual’ as agent 
within the context of poverty is difficult – and within the political economy of the grand 
policy systems – conceptualising the complex conditions that poverty creates 
(acknowledging the suffering of individual people, and the anatomy of that suffering) 
is perplexing.  
 As a child of the 1970s and 1980s, I remember the BBC reportage on 
famines – in Ethiopia (1972), then Bangladesh (1974), then Cambodia (1975), 
Uganda (1980), then Ethiopia again in (1984) – which became a huge influence on 
pop musician Bob Geldof to organise a second 'Concert for Balgladesh', called Live 
Aid, in London in 1985. But as we may remember, representing and articulating the 
suffering of individual people in poverty was generally the job of the media. 
Individuals experiencing conditions of poverty were simply poor people, deprived of 
the basic conditions of well-being and so thus reduced in their human agency. 
Representations of the poor were of weak, desperate, pitiable and immobile victims. 
While this indeed provoked a desirable moral approbation in the West, along with a 
concomitant outpouring of pity, the provocation was largely emotional. There was 
little in the way of collective judgement of the political regimes that engineered the 
famine; our experience of these images were more in the order of a fatalistic pity that 
human history itself is just the sorry tale of such terrible woes, and we must truly feel 
sorry. 
 The work of Amartya Sen during this time was challenging the assumption 
that poverty was entirely attributable to macro-economic deprivations (like an 
insufficient food supply after a failure of harvest), not specific place-based political 
responsibilities for distribution. Moreover, a central motivation was his own 
experience of witnessing individual human suffering. There was something 
concerning individual human agency that was being ignored (in fact, suppressed) in 
the theorisation of poverty and the policy-making of development relief. The 
experience and the representation of the human subject within the spectrum of 
theoretical frameworks Left and Right, which failed to conceptualise the role (and 
thus potential) of individual human agency within the politico-economic complex of 
deprivation and poverty. 
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 Sen's work has been inspiring not just because of its perceptive brilliance, but 
because it tacitly worked with a form of theory (call it 'policy theory') that generated 
potential avenues for both activism (protest, dissent) and policy making (problem 
definition, agenda setting, and deliberation). Deprivation was defined not simply the 
state of being without material sustenance, but an enforced reduction in ‘the human’ 
and common, global, aspirations for self-determination and self-actualisation. Human 
fulfilment and quality of life were re-cast as terms of economic analysis, and 
moreover Sen began attempting to articulate individuality in poverty – not in altruistic 
or welfarist ways, but in terms of capabilities (human propensities and capacity for 
action – in other words, the conditions for their empowerment). This came, of course, 
after the IMF and World Bank's structural adjustment programs of the 1970s and 
1980s (on infrastructure), the subsequent theoretical framings of Welfare Economics, 
Basic Needs or Resource-based understandings of aid, growth and prosperity, along 
with rational-choice theory and growing free-market theories. The concept of 
individuality in relation to choice, action, and empowerment was critical. 
 And to refer to my opening thoughts – the current global popularity of 
'creative' everything (creative cities, creative industries) poses no threat to the 
oppressive regimes that perpetuate development problems. Where arts and culture 
are articulated as a skills-based service within consumer markets, they can easily be 
deployed without any implications for a lack of democracy. Sen's capabilities 
approach arguably generates the conditions of democracy, not simply presuppose 
them or maintain them as a horizon of desirable expectation, (like many development 
theories). Development is predicated on the empowerment of individual human 
agency, not markets or governments or aid organisations. The object of policy is a 
person's 'capabilities' – defined as an ability to function in certain ways that enable a 
fulfilment of values, defined by that person, and through which that person defines 
individual fulfilment or quality of life. The condition of choosing which or what 
combinations of functionings one activates, is of course, the freedom to do so, and 
so a political (or at least civil) dimension is intrinsic to Sen's broader economic theory 
(Sen, 1985; 1988).  
 Sen's work is altogether complex, and I put it to one side to consider Martha 
Nussbaum's more recent and influential attempt to devise a policy-useful tabulation 
of capabilities – what they are and how they could be used in a collectively coherent 
way. By now, the secondary literature on Capabilities is huge, (as well as the 
proliferation in various indices and ways of measuring Capabilities and 
transformative action outside the usual economic or social methods of evaluation). 
Though Nussbaum has a different framework of aims to Sen (animated less by 
economics and more by a philosophy of social justice) her work is intrinsic to the 
evolution of the Human Development framework.  
 In Creating Capabilities (2011) poverty is defined, of course, as security, 
systems of distribution, equality, access and rights, and many other large scale 
concepts. Yet, Nussbaum agonises about the chronic inability of the lexicon of 
mainstream Development theory to represent the real conditions of human 
deprivation. For Nussbaum, defining development in systemic terms can mask the 
very conditions that disable individuals, particularly in terms of gender. The opening 
sections of Creating Capabilities feature a vignette of a woman called Vasanti. She is 
living in poverty in a city in Gujarat, India, the book so attempts to breach the chasm 
between the particularity of Vasanti's experience of poverty and the necessary 
macro-scale (and ethical universality) of development economic theory and the forms 
of policy management we must assume. One issue that strikes the reader early in 
the book is that even within the normative universalism of human rights and social 
justice, we still tend to assume that the poor are all poor because they are subject to 
the same (unjust) macro-scale socio-economic conditions. Yet, as the case of 
Vasanti illustrates, outside the realm of total destitution, poverty is extraordinarily 
particular to the individual, and equally diverse in its social manifestations.  
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Nussbaum's list of capabilities is an attempt to define the anatomy of poverty in terms 
of the disempowerment of the individual capabilities that negotiate and articulate 
agency – subjects acting within material conditions specific to them. Like Sen, she 
avoids the 'negative liberty' problem that would result in a humanist essentialism or a 
diagnostic list of missing elements from the life of a private individual. The capability 
approach is an attempt to define the psycho-social coordinates of a fully actualised 
life of freedom, and takes the following form (I paraphrase for the sake of brevity):   
1. Life: longevity and valuing life itself. 
2. Bodily Health: reproduction, nourishment and shelter. 
3. Bodily Integrity: mobility, personal security, sexual opportunity.  
4. Senses, Imagination, and Thought: imagine, think, and reason.  
5. Emotions: attachments to things and people; love bonds; human association 
and protections.  
6. Practical Reason: conceiving fulfilment, the good; using critical reflection; 
conscience and religious observance. 
7. Affiliation: (i) social interaction, institutions, assembly and speech; (ii) self-
respect, dignity, non non-discrimination. 
8. Other Species: to tend animals, plants, and nature. 
9. Play: to laugh; recreational activities. 
10. Control over one's Environment: (i) political participation and protection; (ii) 
material prosperity, property rights; employment; unionisation; business alliances. 
(Nussbaum, 2011: 33-34). 
 
In the context of this paper, we are most interested in No. 4: [I quote in full]:  
4. Senses, Imagination, and Thought. Being able to use the senses, to 
imagine, think, and reason—and to do these things in a "truly human" way, a 
way informed and cultivated by an adequate education, including, but by no 
means limited to, literacy and basic mathematical and scientific training. 
Being able to use imagination and thought in connection with experiencing 
and producing works and events of one's own choice, religious, literary, 
musical, and so forth. Being able to use one's mind in ways protected by 
guarantees of freedom of expression with respect to both political and artistic 
speech, and freedom of religious exercise. Being able to have pleasurable 
experiences and to avoid non-beneficial pain. 
 
 The categorical distinctions this clause no.4 runs together only indicates its 
minimal usefulness for policymakers. I can hardly summarise the wealth of critique 
this list has provoked – not least how its tabulation evokes the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and the US Constitution all wrapped in the rhetoric of contemporary 
progressive Western liberal democracy. And yes, for these reasons it is also powerful 
and attractive. Lists, of course, present epistemological problems in policy 
development in any case because of their lack of interconnection and order.    
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 I will not join the chorus of responses from those who see this list as asserting 
the superiority of individuals over group or collective rights, as I think the 
reconstruction of the concept of individuality by the Capabilities Approach is 
significant. Indeed, one of the aspects of historical aesthetics I find compelling is how 
'individual' and 'collective' are not ontological absolutes, and individual experience is 
(by virtue of the senses) grounded in the human body and shared conditions of 
embodiment (and not the realms of private proclivity or personal taste). Even 'taste', 
which maintains an extensive breadth of individual expression, for Kant, for instance, 
was grounded in a capacity of judgement that was universal as a human capability 
(in Sen's sense), and whose articulation could only take place through a collectively 
acknowledged order of value. Here is where I think aesthetics could generate a 
series of axiomatic contributions to HD, which in turn presuppose and generate 
agreed collective value – where 'agreed' value does not presuppose collective 
assent: this is what I do have an issue with Nussbaum's list. The list pictures a 
perfectly harmonious society, and not a realm where development is in operation 
(where individual capabilities are politicised and mobilised in relation to resources 
and utilities).  
 
So what would be aesthetic capabilities? I would list them like this: 
Sensibility – the optimal operation of the senses in the capacity for experience of 
artistic form and the complexity of nature. 
Perception – the exercise of observation, taste and discrimination in quality (in art, or 
'qualities' plural in nature). 
Judgment and interpretation – of visual communication and symbolic form.  
Visual depiction –  the innovation and production of a diversity of expressions and 
representations. 
Criticism – linguistic powers of argument, translation, expression and value.  
 
 What is significant about this seemingly random list of historical descriptors is 
that they range from a deep intellectual introspection (sensibility, perception) to 
public discourse (judgment and interpretation), to civil institutions (that visual 
depiction and criticism require). This may seem overly speculative, but I would argue 
that it provokes us to reconsider how this historical discourse might make a series of 
substantive demands on the Capabilities Approach, while retaining the aspirations of 
the current Sen-Nussbaum trajectory towards quality of life and well-being (concepts 
whose that are surely a part of the philosophical history of aesthetics).   
 An investigation of aesthetics could generate some further applications for the 
concept of capability itself – extending the theory into the work of what we might call 
the 'cultural production of the self'. This would imply a more reflexive production of 
subjectivity that is individual (the capacity of deep introspection) and collective (that 
engages in cultural discourse in its many forms) and a more reflexive understanding 
of the empowerment of social agency. In the meantime, an interim exercise would 
involve mapping the historical concept of the aesthetic onto Sen’s basic schema. 

















Perception  Cognitive awareness 
and reflexivity  
Environmental 
awareness 











Participation in public 
discourse 
 Visual 




 Criticism Literacy and discourse Intellectual 
community in civil 
society 
 
 This tabulation provides us with some critical reflection on Nussbaum’s list, as 
well as perhaps highlighting Sen’s own neglect of a theory of culture: understanding 
culture as the experience of certain forms of social empowerment could, ostensibly, 
account for the many of the social processes of valuing, choosing and evaluation that 
Sen takes as central to his crucial 'functionings'.  
 
Concluding: Critical points 
In this unapologetically discursive paper, I have attempted to recover some of the 
historical sense of the concept of the aesthetic. In this I hope to have indicated that 
while aesthetics as a distinct form of inquiry has (for good reason) been marginalised 
in cultural research tout court, an exercise in critical retrieval might allow us to 
expose the cultural deficit implicit in Human Development theory and research. 
Based on the above tabulation of aesthetic capabilities, we could identify potential 
areas for devising and refining critical research questions:  
1. The experience of valuing and choosing (of ‘evaluation’) and the cultural content of 
such. 
2. Imagining the good life (or a state of well-being, or what a ‘quality’ life would feel 
like, or mean) is surely embedded in any assumption that human beings are 
motivation toward such.  
3. The cultural (affective and emotional) basis of all capabilities (delimited in the 
cognition of the individual as components of the self that are to be improved, applied 
and directed).  
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 An individual with the aesthetic capabilities, above, possesses the ability to 
engage with their own empowerment (the programmes and discourses of 
development) reflexively; and empowerment is not merely defined in terms of 
emancipation from disempowerment so much as an engagement in a cultural 
production of the self. They ideally aim to exercise the most complex and sensitive of 
their faculties, locate and maintain a state of solitude and a space of reflection, 
developing a cognitive reflexivity in their capacity for experience; they will stand apart 
of (as subject to object) in contemplation of nature – as opposed to nature as 
domination, or the immersion in nature through want or need. They can be educated 
in human communication and its conventions (expression and representation) – and 
this through finding a community of shared experience (of, say, a natural 
environment, a culture, hierarchies and norms, canons of culture and their values). It 
is not difficult to see how aesthetic capabilities allow for an empowerment of the 
development subject, make education intrinsic to development, and possesses 
implications for a developing civil society.  
 In this, we could support the capabilities approach away from the continual 
criticism that capabilities are defined in ‘individualist’ terms (aesthetic capabilities, 
rather, begin with cultural engagement – of tradition, cultural production, intellectual 
community, and so on.). The form of human agency defined through an aesthetics 
approach preserves the individual as a vital category of development (against its 
neoliberal co-option), but where individuality is developed through intersubjectivity 
(shared experience, communication and interpretation) and civil (institutionalised) 
social life.  
 For while ‘quality of life’ is the broad aim of Capabilities Approach, it is not 
defined in a way sufficiently robust against neoliberal co-option. Functionings need to 
be conceptualised in such a way to prevent the instrumentalisation of vital human 
abilities given the extent of their appropriation within the economies of Western 
consumer cultures. Lastly, Nussbaum’s ‘list’ frames a desired state of citizenry, which 
of course assumes a benign or coherent society that has achieved a reasonable 
degree of institutionalisation. What about life in unstable, informal economies, or life 
under repression, war, anarchy or minority marginalisation? Any framework for 
development needs to empower an individual in a way that the need for informal self-




1. This is the written script, which in the event was spoken, and accompanied by 28 
Power point slides, which cannot be reproduced here for reasons of copyright.  
2: Quotations from Nussbaum, M. (2011) Creating Capabilities (Camb. Masss.: 
Belknap Press, pp.33-34)]. 
3: We need to bear in mind Sen's resistance to such a tabulation, suggesting that the 
articulation of capabilities in a policy format must be the production of public reason – 
i.e. for that individual culture and society.   
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